Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction by G

Description: Truth in Virtue of Meaning by Gillian Russell The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences - the idea that some sentences are true or false just in virtue of what they mean - is a famous focus of philosophical controversy. Gillian Russell reinvigorates the debate with a challenging new defence of the distinction, showing that it is compatible with semantic externalism. FORMAT Hardcover LANGUAGE English CONDITION Brand New Publisher Description The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will betrue. This distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way. One can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what itmeans. But many twentieth-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didnt even make sense, and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldnt see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments of Quine and his supporters. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have beenrefined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language - semantic externalism - on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might betempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. In Truth in Virtue of Meaning, Gillian Russell argues that it hasnt. Using the tools of contemporary philosophy of language, she outlines a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. She then goes on to draw out the surprising epistemological consequencesof her approach. Author Biography Gillian Russell is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St Louis. Table of Contents PrefaceAcknowledgementsIntroductionI: The Positive View1: The in virtue of Relation2: Meaning3: Beyond ModalityA: The Formal SystemII: A Defence4: The Spectre of "Two Dogmas"5: Definitions6: More Arguments Against AnalyticityIII: Work for Epistemologists7: Analytic Justification Review Russells book is impressive and richly argued... she has brought the debate on analyticity to a new level. In her book she presents us with an alternative, well-developed and highly original way of thinking about truth in virtue of meaning, one that cirumvents many of the difficulties that plague traditional analyticity. This makes the book a must-read by anybody interested in the topic of analyticity, and the nature of meaning generally. * Åsa Wikforss, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *This is an excellent book which, in my opinion, ought to be read by any philosopher whose work is focused on analyticity, and which will be of considerable interest to those interested in contemporary philosophy of language more generally ... Stylistically the book is a delight ... This deserves to eb an influential book, and I am confident it will spark a new trend in debated about analyticity. * C. S. Jenkins, Mind * Promotional A timely study of a central topic in epistemology and the philosophy of language Long Description The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will betrue. This distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way. One can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many twentieth-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were noanalytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didnt even make sense, and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldnt see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments of Quine and his supporters. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language- semantic externalism - on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. In Truth in Virtue of Meaning, Gillian Russell arguesthat it hasnt. Using the tools of contemporary philosophy of language, she outlines a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. She then goes on to draw out the surprising epistemological consequences of her approach. Review Quote This is an excellent book which, in my opinion, ought to be read by any philosopher whose work is focused on analyticity, and which will be of considerable interest to those interested in contemporary philosophy of language more generally ... Stylistically the book is a delight ... This deserves to eb an influential book, and I am confident it will spark a new trend in debated about analyticity. Feature A timely study of a central topic in epistemology and the philosophy of languageBreathes new life into the old debate on analyticity Details ISBN0199232199 Author Gillian Russell Short Title TRUTH IN VIRTUE OF MEANING Language English ISBN-10 0199232199 ISBN-13 9780199232192 Media Book Format Hardcover DEWEY 121.68 Illustrations Yes Year 2008 Imprint Oxford University Press Place of Publication Oxford Country of Publication United Kingdom Affiliation Washington University in Saint Louis, USA Subtitle A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction DOI 10.1604/9780199232192 UK Release Date 2008-02-28 AU Release Date 2008-02-28 NZ Release Date 2008-02-28 Pages 256 Publisher Oxford University Press Publication Date 2008-02-28 Alternative 9780199694730 Audience Undergraduate We've got this At The Nile, if you're looking for it, we've got it. With fast shipping, low prices, friendly service and well over a million items - you're bound to find what you want, at a price you'll love! TheNile_Item_ID:53300771;

Price: 136.02 AUD

Location: Melbourne

End Time: 2024-12-08T02:17:11.000Z

Shipping Cost: 10.03 AUD